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Introduction 
During the mid-1970s, when the legality of baseball's reserve clause was called into 
question, [1] maverick Oakland A's owner Charles O. Finley proposed to his fellow 
owners that they should sign all players to one-year contracts, and allow them to become 
free agents, whose services will (typically) go to the highest bidder, after each season. 
His proposal was decried as ludicrous by his peers, and rejected out of hand. (Fresno Bee, 
8/14/94) 
Twenty years later, after three rounds of collusion hearings and billions of dollars in 
long-term contracts issued to players, it is time to reexamine Finley's proposal, at least 
theoretically. For today, an axiom in Major League Baseball is that players perform well 
in their "walk year," that is, the season prior to becoming a free agent, because they 
expect that exceptional performance immediately preceding free agency will be rewarded 
with a potentially lucrative contract. Larry Lucchino, president of the San Diego Padres, 
said that he certainly believes that players' performance is affected by their being in their 
walk year, and that this sentiment is widespread among front-office personnel throughout 
the league. He added, however, that whether players perform better or worse than they 
normally would varies from case to case. "It depends on the mentality of the individual 
players. Some are more financially motivated than others. It's human nature (for 
performance to be effected by playing for a contract)." While Lucchino said that he 
thinks some players shine in this situation, "For others, (the pressure) might be 
debilitating." Still, whether they "overperform" or underperform, it is clear that there is 
incentive for players to do well in their walk year. 
This same incentive is not present for players either already tied up in long-term contracts 
or those without enough major league service time to qualify for free-agent status. [2] 
Were Finley's plan adopted, this incentive would be present for all players in all seasons, 
instead of just the few hoping for lucrative contracts at the end of the year. While the 
competitive balance (and aggregate statistics) may not be effected, if work effort is 
indeed endogenous, overall effort (and "hustle") would likely be increased, and a finer 
product would be put on the field, potentially increasing attendance and thus revenues. 
Thus, this paper seeks to test whether the assertion that players perform better and expend 
more effort in their "walk year" is empirically observable. To do so, section II presents a 
model of the relationships between performance, effort and walk-year incentive, and 
reviews previous work done on similar topics. Section III discusses the relationship 
between performance and marginal revenue product. Section IV presents data and 
methodology, and section V states conclusions. 
II. The model and previous work 
At the present time annual free-agency for all is far from a reality [3]. In its place lie 
allegations against players of only trying their hardest in their walk year, implying 
shirking in other seasons. These allegations, if true, frame an example of the principal-
agent problem. The principal (team owners and upper-management) cannot discern a 
player's true effort E. This is the case because observable measures of performance, while 
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based on effort, are also the product of other variables. For example, a disappointing year 
cannot definitively be blamed on lack of effort, as pitchers may be pitching around a 
batter due to weak lineup support. Krautmann (1990) modeled a player's productivity, or 
marginal physical product MPP, as a function of several factors, including E, a measure 
of talent level T, and a random variable X, so that  
(1) 
 
He hypothesized that there may be some opportunity cost to players to give the maximum 
E (e.g., aversion to additional training, giving up or reducing drinking, etc.) Therefore, 
while it is always in the owner's best interests to have the player maximize E, it may only 
in the player's best interest to maximize E when he knows he will be best rewarded for 
his additional effort. At no time is this more the case than when a player is in his "walk 
year." Thus, effort E is modeled 
(2) 
 
where W is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a player is in his walk year, and Z is all 
other factors influencing his effort, such as the aforementioned aversion to additional 
training, wages, etc. 
While this paper uses Krautmann's model of the stochastic nature of performance, it will 
test it differently than Krautmann did. Krautmann tested the performance of the 110 
position players who signed contracts of greater than five years' duration between 1976 
and 1983, comparing their slugging percentage in the year prior to the contract signing 
with lifetime performance up to that point. He found that only 5 players (4.5%) had 
"super-par" or significantly above average years relative to career performance in the 
year before signing the long-term contract, which he concluded were merely outliers in a 
stochastic distribution of performance. Krautmann additionally tested whether players 
registered "sub-par" performances relative to their career averages in the first year of the 
long-term contracts. He only found 2 players (1.8%) with such seasons, again concluding 
that they were outliers. Thus, Krautmann asserted that allegations of shirking were 
merely a product of front-office personnel misunderstanding the concept of regression to 
the mean. 
In addition to the above findings on which he based his conclusions, Krautmann found 
that 71 players (64%) performed above their career averages in the year immediately 
following the contract signing, while 39 players (36%) played below their means. While 
this starkly contradicts any theory of shirking due to long-term job security, Krautmann 
also found that 68 players (62%) performed above their career averages in the pre-signing 
year, while 42 (38%) played below their means, suggesting that extra effort may be 
present in the pre-signing year. 
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There is additional evidence which somewhat contradict Krautmann's findings. Work 
done by then-Player Relations Committee head Lee MacPhail in the mid-1980s found 
that players with contracts of three years or more spent nearly 50 percent more time on 
the disabled list than did those with one-year contracts. MacPhail also concluded that a 
player's batting average dropped by an average of nearly 20 points after he signed a 
guaranteed multi-year deal. [4] (TSN, 8/19/91) The Sporting News similarly found 
evidence of free agents' production diminishing immediately following the walk year in 
its study of free agency in the 1990s (See Figure 1). 
Figure 1 - Free agents in the 1990s  
 
  PITCHERS 
  Improved next year Same next year Worse next year 
Those who re-signed 28% 6% 66% 
Those who switched teams 36% 16% 48% 
Total 33% 13% 54% 
  NON-PITCHERS 
  Improved next year Same next year Worse next year 
Those who re-signed 26%. 21% 53% 
Those who switched teams 31% 13% 56% 
Total 29% 16% 55% 
  ALL FREE AGENTS 
  Improved next year Same next year Worse next year 
Those who re-signed 26% 15% 59% 
Those who switched teams 33% 15% 52% 
Total 31% 15% 54% 
 
source- The Sporting News, November 23, 1992 
 
While this paper is concerned with a similar subject matter to Krautmann's, they differ in 
several respects. First and foremost, Krautmann focused on whether there is evidence of 
shirking in the first year of long-term contracts; here the hypothesis is not that players 
underperform after signing long-term contracts, but that they expend additional effort 
immediately preceding free agency in anticipation of such a lucrative contract. Multi-year 
contracts can be extensions of present agreements, and can be signed in mid-season. 
Free-agent contracts come after a player has played an entire season with the knowledge 
that the size of his next contract will at least partially depend on his performance in that 
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season. Thus, it is more likely that a player will expend additional effort in the season 
prior to free agency when compared with the season (or part of season) before signing a 
long-term contract. 
Secondly, this study uses a larger and more up-to-date sample than Krautmann's, 
examining all free agents beginning with the end of the 1989 season through the free-
agent class following the 1992 season. Given TSN's findings, albeit crude, it is not 
unreasonable to suspect that Krautmann's findings may be dated. Additionally, the larger 
sample should make for a more powerful test. 
The start date is so chosen because players could not expect to receive lucrative free-
agent contracts in the offseasons following the 1985, 1986 and 1987 seasons, when 
owners colluded to keep free-agent salaries down. (Bruggink and Rose, 1990) (WSJ, 
5/20/91) Furthermore, it is also reasonable to assume that given the owners' choice not to 
reward performance in that period, it was not until after the 1988 offseason, when the 
free-agent market was again unrestricted, that players about to become free agents would 
expend additional effort in anticipation of lucrative deals. The end date is so chosen 
because the strike-shortened 1994 season poses statistical comparison problems.  
The statistics used by this study also are different from those used by Krautmann. 
Krautmann used slugging average (see Appendix A) as his sole measure of player 
performance. While a better measuring tool of offensive production than most (e.g., 
batting average, homeruns, Runs Batted In), as well as one which has gained acceptance 
in economic circles, [5] slugging average has its limitations as a measure of overall 
player performance. [6] Instead, here Total Player Rating, a comprehensive statistic 
complexly devised (see Appendix A) but simple to understand ESPNET SportsZone 
described it as "how many wins above a league average performer a player achieves in a 
season, taking into account a players hitting, fielding and basestealing statistics" - is used 
to measure performance. In addition, two measures not necessarily measuring 
performance but hypothesized to measure effort - games played and stolen bases 
attempted are considered. [7]  
Furthermore, one of Krautmann's fundamental assumptions, that a player's production is 
identically distributed across time, is a doubtful assertion, at best. This assumption is 
significant because a player may perform at a high level the year after he signs a long-
term contract merely due to the fact that he is still improving as a player. Similarly, if a 
player's performance is unchanged, it may be because his potential increased but his 
effort fell. Krautmann's justification for his assumption that most players spend between 
three and five years in the minor leagues before making a major league roster is dubious. 
If a player was in the minors the year before his rookie season, this means that, with few 
exceptions, he was worse than every single player on the major league roster that year. It 
would take a dramatic improvement in one year for a player to go from worse than all 
players on a team to worse than half of them. Furthermore, in Krautmann's model this 
improvement suddenly comes to a halt once a player begins to play at the major league 
level, an even more ludicrous assumption that Eddie Epstein, the Padres' director of 
baseball operations, calls "Just not true." As evidence, consider that Rookie of the Year 
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selections have been made every year since 1947 in both leagues since 1949 but only one 
player (Fred Lynn in 1975) has ever won both that honor and been selected Most 
Valuable Player in the same year, although several ROY winners have gone on to earn 
MVP awards. This despite the fact that a significant, if small, percentage of players in the 
majors at a given time are rookies. 
The Relationship Between Performance and Marginal Revenue Product 
Above it has been implicitly assumed that a player's future salary is directly determined 
by on-field performance. This, while to the layperson seems obvious, is hardly so for the 
economist. Rather than base salary directly on a player's marginal physical product MPP, 
the economist model sets the efficient market salary equal to a player's marginal revenue 
product MRP, that is, the additional revenue that player is responsible for generating. 
Thus, a number of studies have concerned themselves with different ways to measure 
MRP, beginning with Scully (1974). However, while different estimates for MRP exist 
(Scully; Sommers and Quinton, 1982), how exactly MRP is determined is not particularly 
relevant to this paper. According to Lucchino, the Padres, as well as the vast majority of 
teams, base salaries on expected performance and what the player will add to the team's 
place in the standings (MPP) rather than MRP. In other words, Major League Baseball 
teams balance performance, not revenue, with cost. Furthermore, to the extent that 
profitability is considered, there exists a relationship that if a team wins, it will draw fans, 
sell merchandise, etc., thus increasing revenue. Bruggink and Rose found that each 
winning percentage point raises revenue $53,070.50, with a t statistic of 5.84, meaning 
the correlation is significant at the 99% level. So even from a business standpoint, 
maximizing production is related to increasing profit. 
Still, even if teams were interested only in maximizing revenue, as opposed to 
production, with respect to cost, the only variable within the player's control which 
effects revenue is effort. 
Data and Methodology 
To test whether players "overperformed" in their walk year, performances of the 188 non-
pitcher free agents who signed with a major league team following the 1989-1992 
seasons were compared. [8] TPR data for each free agent in his walk year, as well as for 
each season surrounding the walk year, was compiled. The 188 includes all free-agent 
seasons for a player in the period,  
Figure 2.0 - Summary of variables and raw data 
 
 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
NAME | 0 - - - - 
YEAR | 0 - - - - 
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GAMES | 509 106.0648 38.28156 3 162 
SB | 509 7.269155 11.51327 0 93 
CS | 509 3.306483 3.406856 0 21 
TPR | 509 -0.0923379 1.616073 -4.5 9.2 
WALKYR | 509 0.3693517 0.4831041 0 1 
LSEASON | 509 0.0825147 0.275418 0 1 
TPRP | 321 -0.076324 1.597381 -4.5 8.8 
TPRA | 188 -0.1196809 1.651441 -3.5 9.2 
SBA | 509 10.57564 14.23013 0 106 
 
 
Figure 2.1 - Walk year regressed on performance 
 
 
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 509 
Model 0.2229 1 0.2229 F(1, 507) = 0.09 
Residual 1326.5172 507 2.6164 Prob > F = 0.7705 
Total 1326.7401 508 2.6117 R-squared = 0.0002 
 - - - - Adj R-sqr= -0.0018 
- - - - Root MSE = -1.6175 
 
TPR Coef. Std.Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
WALKYR -0.0434 0.1486 -0.292 0.771 -0.3352 0.2485 
_cons -0.0763 0.0903 -0.845 0.398 -0.02537 0.101 
 
 
e.g., if a player is a free agent in 1990 and 1992, both of those seasons are counted in the 
188. However, in the event that a player was a free agent in consecutive seasons, each 
season's statistics were only counted once, and considered a walk year rather than a 
surrounding season. The walk year variable WALKYR was regressed on the performance 
variable TPR to find how much being in the walk year influenced performance. The 
results (see Figure 2.1) showed that walk year and performance level are not even weakly 
correlated. Being in the walk year had an infinitesimally small negative impact on TPR (-
.04), which not only explained a negligible amount of deviations in TPR (R 2 = .0002), 
but was also insignificant at even the 50% level (t = -.292).  
Whether knowing a player's statistics in the seasons surrounding the walk year would be 
an unbiased estimation of walk year performance was also tested. This was done by 
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averaging a player's performance in the seasons surrounding the walk year (or years), and 
regressing this mean AVGTPRP on the actual average performance in the walk year (or 
years) AVGTPRA (see Figure 3.0). If a player was a free agent in two non-consecutive 
seasons, his performances were counted separately. The result was that the two are highly 
correlated, (coefficient on AVGTPRA = .73, significant at the 95% level; see Figures 3.1 
and 3.2), but that  
 
Figure 3.0 - Summary of a player's average performance in his walk year and the surrounding seasons 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
NAME 0 - - - - 
AVGTPRP 165 -0.0893939 1.352975 -2.75 7.6 
AVGTPRA 165 -0.0841414 1.661499 -3.5 9.2 
Figure 3.1 - Avg. TPR in surrounding seasons regressed on avg. TPR in walk year 
 
 
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 165 
Model 162.54736 1 162.5474 F(1, 163 = 91.30 
Residual 290.18753 163 1.7803 Prob >F = 0.0000 
Total 452.73489 164 2.7606 R-squared = 0.3590 
 -  -  -  - Adj R-sqr = 0.3551 
- - -  - Root MSE= 1.3343 
 
AVGTPR
A Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. 
Interval
] 
AVGTPRP 0.7358 0.0770 9.5550 0.0000 0.5838 0.8879 
_cons -0.0184 0.1041 -0.1760 0.8600 -0.2239 0.1872 
 
 
players' performances, while when aggregated in large numbers are very similar between 
walk year and surrounding seasons, on an individual basis can vary greatly between the 
two types of seasons examined in this paper (R 2 = .3590). This likely means that 
performance is stochastic, and distributed randomly over time, as Krautmann asserted.  
However, there is another possible explanation, in addition to the stochastic nature of 
performance. Noting Lucchino's comment about walk-year incentive pressure affecting 
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different players in different ways, whether the variance of performance in the walk year 
is significantly different from variance in the surrounding years was examined by using a 
standard deviation test (see Figure 4.0). The t value yielded by the test was -1.04, 
meaning that there is a 70.1% chance that the two standard deviations are different. This 
is not significant at the 95%  
 
Figure 3.2 - T test comparing avg. TPR in walk years with avg. TPR in the surrounding seasons 
 
 
Paired t test     Number of obs =165 
Variable Mean Std. Err t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
AVGTPRA -0.0841 0.1293 -0.6505 0.5163 -0.3395 0.1713 
AVGTPRP -0.0894 0.1053 -0.8487 0.3973 -0.2974 0.1186 
       
diff 0.0053 0.1072 0.0490 0.9610 -0.2065 0.2170 
Degrees of freedom: 164 
Ho: mean diff = 0 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff ~= 0 Ha: diff > 0 
t = 0.049 t = 0.049 t = 0.049 
P < t = 0.5195 P > |t| = 0.9610 P > t = 0.4805 
 
 
Figure 4.0 - Standard deviations test of avg. TPR in walk years with avg. TPR in surrounding seasons 
 
Paired t test     Number of obs =165 
Variable Mean Std. Err t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
AVGTPRA -0.0841 0.1293 -0.6505 0.5163 -0.3395 0.1713 
AVGTPRP -0.0894 0.1053 -0.8487 0.3973 -0.2974 0.1186 
       
combined -0.0878 0.0834 -1.0403 0.2990 -0.2508 0.0773 
Ho: sd(AVGTPRA) = sd(AVGTPRP) 
F Observed = F = F(164,164) = 1.508 
F Lower tail = F_L = F(164,164) = 0.663 
F Upper tail = F_U = F(164,164) = 1.508 
Ha: s1 < s2 Ha: s1 ~= s2 Ha: s1 > s2 
P < F = 0.9956 P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.0089 P > F = 0.0044 
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level. [9]  
Whether a player's effort, as measured by games and stolen bases attempted, was 
significantly affected by a player being in his walk year was also tested. Again, any 
difference was insignificant (see Figures 5.0 and 5.1). Thus, there seems to be no 
evidence that players increase their effort in their walk year, as measured by both 
performance and hypothesized effort variables. 
Conclusions 
While there may have been some problems with Krautmann's study, his conclusions are  
Figure 5.0 - Walk year regressed on games played 
 
 
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 509 
Model 778.5079 1 778.5079 F(1, 507) = 0.09 
Residual 743684.353 507 146.8330 Prob > F = 0.4666 
Total 744462.861 508 1465.4781 R-squared = 0.0010 
 -  -  -  -  Adj R-sqr = -0.0009 
- - - - Root MSE= 38.299 
 
Games Coef. Std.Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
WALKYR 2.5625 3.51734 0.729 0.467 -4.3480 9.4729 
_cons 105.1184 2.1377 49.175 0.000 100.9186 109.3181 
 
Figure 5.1 - Walk year regressed on stolen bases attempted 
 
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 509 
Model 37.6138 1 37.6138 F(1, 507) = 0.19 
Residual 102830.724 507 202.8219 Prob > F = 0.6669 
Total 102868.338 508 202.4967 R-squared = 0.0004 
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 -  -  -  -  Adj R-sqr = -0.0016 
- - - - Root MSE= 14.242 
 
Games Coef. Std.Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
WALKYR 0.5632 1.3079 0.431 0.667 -2.0063 3.1389 
_cons 10.3676 0.7949 13.043 0.000 8.8059 11.9293 
 
 
also borne out by this paper. It appears that a player's average performance in his walk 
year is not significantly different from his average performance in similar seasons. 
Similarly, using games and stolen bases attempted as measures of effort, it is clear that 
players do not expend additional effort in their walk years. One difference found between 
walk-year and surrounding-seasons performance is the larger standard deviation of walk-
year performance, though this difference is not significant at the 95% level. A possible 
explanation for this small difference is that while on average players perform the same in 
both cases, an individual player may have a significantly better or worse than average 
performance in the walk year due to the additional pressure of looming free agency. 
 
While the results of this study are clear on paper, there remains one potential problem 
which may call these findings into question. It is possible that teams make a concerted 
effort to sign above-average and star players to multi-year contract extensions, meaning 
that such prime performers are rarely eligible for free agency. If this is true, then a data 
set composed solely of free agents as this paper uses is not a representative pool. This 
bias can be mitigated in future studies several ways. First, one can test players the year 
before and the year after they sign long-term contracts, as Krautmann did. This, however, 
poses two problems discussed in section II, namely that many long-term contracts are 
signed mid-season, making testing difficult, and that any time a player signs a contract 
extension, he may already be "shirking" due to a current multi-year contract; thus, 
evidence of a drop-off in performance may not be observed. Another way of getting 
around the "selecting out" of stars in the free-agent pool is to somehow control for salary. 
For example, one can divide free agents into quintiles based on salary prior to becoming 
free agents (or salary after signing the new contract), and test the performances before 
and after free agency separately for each quintile. Similarly, players can be divided into 
quintiles based on some measure of performance. Here the recommendation would be 
either career TPR, TPR over the previous n seasons, or TPR in the year prior to free 
agency. 
For the rest of the players filling out major league rosters, who seem to be well 
represented in the sample, the disincentive to perform provided by not being a free agent 
in the coming offseason may be offset by the possibility of being granted their 
unconditional release. Furthermore, incentive clauses sometimes in place in newly-signed 
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contracts, such as rewarding players' based on games played, slugging percentage, etc., 
may reduce the principal-agent problem. 
While there may be some problems with the sample, it appears that in the labor market 
for veteran baseball players, even when direct financial incentive to maximize effort may 
be weak, indirect financial incentives, or other non-financial incentives, may compensate. 
For example, for good players, financial reward in the next negotiated contract may be 
considered even before the walk year; for bad players, the possibility of not making the 
team the next year may motivate those not in their walk year. Endorsement opportunities, 
recognition by ones peers and by the public and media are other examples of reasons why 
players may perform well even when not in their walk year. 
The conclusions of this paper in the specific labor market for major league veterans may 
have applications in other labor markets where effort is difficult to measure. For example, 
one may hypothesize that in the labor market for college professors with tenure there may 
be little direct financial incentive to expend maximum effort. However, it would be 
interesting to test whether other considerations, such as the respect of peers, outside 
income from being an "expert" in the field, and revenues from published material and 
textbooks, factor in to ensure that close to maximum effort is put forth. 
Appendix A: Computation of baseball statistics 
 
Batting runs , 
 
where 1B is singles, 2B is doubles, 3B is triples, HR is home runs, BB is walks, 
HB is hit by pitches, AB is at bats, and H is hits. 
Batting wins Batting runs divided by runs per win. 
 
Fielding runs , 
 
 
where PO is putouts, A is assists, E is errors, DP is double plays, and K is strikeouts. This 
formula is for second basemen, third basemen and shortstops; it is slightly modified for 
other positions. The idea is to measure the number of "runs saved" by a player beyond 
what the league-average performer would have done. 
Fielding wins Fielding runs divided by runs per win. 
 
Runs per win The average number of runs (usually about 10) in a given season which 
produced an additional win beyond average. That average is defined as a team record of 
.500 (which a league won-lost average must be). 
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Slugging average 
 
A better measure of performance than batting average, as it weights extra-base hits, but 
not as good a measure as batting runs or TPR, as slugging average omits important 
variables and misweights the ones it uses. 
Stolen base runs .30(SB) - .60(CS), 
where SB is stolen bases and CS is caught stealing. 
 
Stolen base wins Stolen base runs divided by runs per win. 
 
Stolen bases attempted SB + CS. 
 
Total Player Rating Batting wins (adjusted for league average and home "park factor") 
+ fielding wins + stolen base wins - positional adjustment. Designed to measure all-
around performance for non-pitchers, i.e., position players. 
Appendix B: Breakdown of individual performances in walk year and surrounding 
seasons 
 
Total Player Rating Surrounding season Walk year Total
-4.5 1 0 1 
-3.5 0 2 2 
-3.4 0 1 1 
-3.3 2 0 2 
-3.2 2 0 2 
-3 0 1 1 
-2.8 2 0 2 
-2.7 1 2 3 
-2.6 1 0 1 
-2.5 2 1 3 
-2.4 2 1 3 
-2.3 1 3 4 
-2.2 3 1 4 
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-2.1 2 3 5 
-2 5 1 6 
-1.9 5 4 9 
-1.8 3 1 4 
-1.7 4 4 8 
-1.6 9 6 15 
-1.5 3 3 6 
-1.4 8 7 15 
-1.3 3 3 6 
-1.2 12 0 12 
-1.1 10 5 15 
-1 10 5 15 
-.9 6 6 12 
-.8 8 5 13 
-.7 8 9 17 
-.6 5 4 9 
-.5 9 10 19 
-.4 12 5 17 
-.3 14 5 19 
-.2 17 6 23 
-.1 13 6 19 
0 12 7 19 
.1 9 5 14 
.2 13 3 16 
.3 9 4 13 
.4 8 7 15 
.5 5 5 10 
.6 9 1 10 
.7 9 2 11 
.8 2 4 6 
.9 5 3 8 
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1 4 2 6 
1.1 4 3 7 
1.2 4 6 10 
1.3 5 2 7 
1.4 2 3 5 
1.5 2 2 4 
1.6 3 1 4 
1.7 2 1 3 
1.8 3 1 4 
1.9 1 0 1 
2 2 1 3 
2.1 3 1 4 
2.2 3 0 3 
2.3 1 1 2 
2.4 2 0 2 
2.6 1 0 1 
2.9 1 0 1 
3 0 1 1 
3.1 1 2 3 
3.2 1 2 3 
3.3 0 2 2 
3.4 0 2 2 
3.5 2 0 2 
3.6 3 0 3 
4.1 2 1 3 
4.6 0 1 1 
4.7 1 0 1 
5.3 0 1 1 
5.9 1 0 1 
6.4 1 0 1 
8.2 1 0 1 
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8.8 1 0 1 
9.2 0 1 1 
Total 321 188 509 
Endnotes 
1 The reserve clause, which prohibited player movement from team to team except 
through trade or sale, was overturned by an arbitrator in 1975. (Bruggink and Rose, 1990) 
.  
2 Currently, this latter criterion applies to those with fewer than six major league seasons.  
 
3 This is not meant to imply that universal perennial free agency is either a viable option 
politically or even an improvement on the current free-agent system. Eliminating long-
term contracts would be inefficient from both team and individual perspectives. In 
addition, it is important for a team to have monopsony control over its players at the 
beginning of their careers to recoup for research and development costs of scouting 
players at the amateur level and training them in the minor leagues, much like drug 
companies need the short-term monopolies granted by patents. Finally, the expanded 
player movement might alienate fans.  
 
4 Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain a copy of MacPhail's study. When I asked John 
Ricco, my contact at the PRC, to send me a copy, he was unable to view it himself, and 
was told that it was "an internal document." The study allegedly helped start the 
'Collusion Era' in Major League Baseball (WSJ, 5/20/91).  
 
5 Krautmann cites three papers, including Scully, as studies which have used slugging 
average as a proxy for performance.  
 
6 Among other things, slugging average discounts baserunning, defense and ability to 
draw walks. In addition, as a simple percentage, it weighs average performance, not 
aggregate performance, meaning that a player who bats 4 times and one who bats 400 
times in a season can be said to perform at the same level.  
 
7 Krautmann refers to a study by Lehn which found that, "On average every additional 
year remaining on a multiyear contract was associated with a 25 percent increase in 
number of days spent on the disabled list." (Krautmann, 963).  
17 
 
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje 
 
8 Lists of players filing for free agency were obtained from issues of The New York 
Times and The Sporting News.  
 
9 However, a larger percentage of walk year TPRs fell outside of the overall 95% 
confidence interval of {-3.26, 3.07} (15 out of 188; 8.0%) than surrounding year TPRs 
(17 out of 321; 5.3%) (see Appendix B).  
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